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Abstract.  Agents  are  autonomous  software  components  that  work  with  one 
another in a decentralized fashion to achieve some end. Agent systems have 
been  used  in  Technology  Enhanced  Learning  (TEL)  before,  but  these 
applications seldom take advantage of the fact that each agent may have its own 
goals and strategies, which makes agent systems an attractive way of providing 
personalized  learning.  In  particular,  since  agents  can  solve  problems  in  a 
decentralized way, this makes them an attractive way of supporting informal 
learning.  In  this  paper  we  use  scenarios  to  examine  how  common  problem 
solving  techniques  from  the  agents  world  (voting,  coalition  formation  and 
auction systems) map to significant challenges for personalized and informal 
learning in the TEL world. Through an agent simulation we then show how an 
agent system might perform in one of those scenarios and explore how different 
agent strategies might influence the outcome. Based on this work we argue that 
agent systems provide a way of providing ultra-personalization of the learning 
process in a decentralized way and highlight equitability and scrutability as two 
key challenges for future investigation. 
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1   Introduction 
Agents are special software components that work together in an agent framework to 
achieve some end. Their main features include autonomy, reactiveness, proactiveness 
and social ability [1]. Multi-agent systems, where several such agents interact, are 
being  used  in  a  wide  variety  of  applications,  ranging  from  comparatively  small 
systems for personal assistance, to open, complex, systems for industrial applications 
[2].  In  Technology  Enhanced  Learning  (TEL)  they  can  provide  new  models  of 
learning and applications, such as personal assistants, user guides and alternative help 
systems, which are helpful for both students and teachers [3].  It has also been argued 
that using multi-agent systems to design educational systems lead to more versatile, 
faster and lower cost systems [4]. 
We  believe  that  the  major  potential  in  multi-agent  systems  has  yet  to  be  fully 
explored, and that it relates to the ability of agent systems to support personalized and 
informal learning. In the e-learning domain we are increasingly seeing a move from a world  of  VLEs  (Virtual  Learning  Environments)  into  a  space  where  students  are 
taking  more  control  of  their  learning  in  the  form  of  PLEs  (Personal  Learning 
Environments),  either  as  monolithic  applications  to  help  students  manage  their 
resources and time, or as a collection of online tools (such as Google calendar to 
manage time, 43 Things to manage goals, etc). In this personalized learning context 
agent  technology  becomes  even  more  appropriate  because  agents  are  good  at 
representing  the  requirements  of  users,  and  negotiating  a  more  personalized 
experience. There is also a lot of potential to support informal learning, because in a 
decentralized agent system there is no need for a central authority (such as a tutor or 
academic institution) to orchestrate collaborations and learning activities. 
In this paper we explore the potential of multi-agent systems for personalized and 
informal learning. We first present a number of scenarios that show how common 
problem solving techniques in the agents world (voting systems, coalition formation 
and  auction  systems)  could  map  to  problems  in  TEL,  and  explore  how  agent 
technologies could lead to ultra-personalization and decentralization, enabling new 
scenarios that are not possible with today’s technology.  
We then present a multi-agent simulation of the first of these scenarios (students 
making module choices) in order to demonstrate how a multi-agent system can solve 
problems in a decentralized way. In a comparative experiment we also explore how 
different student strategies (the algorithms that individual agents use to negotiate with 
each other) affect the outcome. 
Our research demonstrates how agent systems could be applied to TEL to support 
personalized and informal learning, but it also highlights a number of key issues that 
may be of concern to educators.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work 
focusing  on  personalized  and  informal  learning  and  the  existing  use  of  agent 
technology in TEL. Section 3 presents three scenarios that show how solutions from 
the agent domain might be used to solve problems from the TEL domain in a novel 
way. Section 4 describes an agent simulation of the first of these scenarios, and an 
experiment to compare the performance of three different student strategies. Section 5 
analyses our findings and argues that while agent systems enable ultra-personalization 
and decentralization they also present new problems of equitability and scrutability. 
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses our future work plans. 
2   Background 
2.1   Personalized and Informal Learning 
Personalization in an educational setting is about  working in partnership  with the 
learner to tailor their learning experience and pathways according to their needs and 
personal objectives. Personalization is perceived as the task of providing every learner 
with appropriate learning opportunities to meet individual learning needs supported 
by relevant resources that promote choice and advance learner autonomy [5]. The 
concept of personalized learning emerged as a result of several developments. Partly, 
it is a reflection of living and working in a modern society, the developments of new technologies,  and  in  particular  how  they  can  enable  learners  to  break  down 
institutional barriers and become a part of a global society.  
There is also a growing recognition that current educational provision may be to 
narrow and restrictive and is not meeting the individuals learners or society needs as a 
whole [6]. Current learners see technology as core to their learning environments in 
particular computer and mobile devices. They use the Internet usually to support their 
learning, to find information and to discuss work with other students and teachers. 
They are comfortable working with multiple representations, are digitally literate, and 
happy to turn to Internet-based tools to help achieve their learning [5]. 
Sampson [7] has suggested that e-learning benefits from the advanced information 
processing  and  the  Internet  technologies  to  provide  the  following  features  which 
could be considered as lineaments of personalized learning: 
•  Personalization, where learning material are customized to individual learners, 
based on an analysis of the learners objectives, status and learning preferences.  
•  Interactivity, where learners can experience active and situated learning through 
simulations of real-world events and on-line collaboration.  
•  Media-rich content, i.e. educational materials presented in different forms and 
styles. 
•  Just-in-time delivery, i.e. support systems that can facilitate training delivery at 
the exact time and place that it is needed to complete a certain task.  
•  User-centric environments, where learners take responsibility for their own 
learning. 
Although personalized learning is increasingly recognized as important in formal 
settings, it is key for informal learning. There are many definitions of formal and 
informal  learning,  however  the  key  distinction  is  that  formal  learning  is  typically 
described as learning that is managed in some manner by an authority (for example, a 
School or University), while informal learning is less managed, or may be managed 
by the learner themselves [8, 9]. A survey by Cross showed that 70 percent of adult 
learning is self-directed learning [10] and informal learning is increasingly recognized 
as a key domain for TEL, 
Based on these definitions we believe that agent technology is a good approach to 
support personalized and informal learning. This is because of the characteristics of 
intelligent  agents,  which  are  autonomy,  social  ability,  adaptability,  and  reaction. 
Agents can easily represent learners, adapting content and acting autonomously on 
their behalf. In addition, they can interact with multiple students and agents at the 
same time in order to facilitate collaborative and team learning [1] without the need 
for a formal centralized authority. 
2.2   Agent Technologies  
The term agent has been in existence in a number of technologies and been widely 
used,  for  example,  in  artificial  intelligence,  databases,  operating  systems  and  the 
marketplace [2]. Researchers in the agent technology field have proposed a variety of 
definitions of what comprises an agent but all agree that a key feature is autonomy. One of the most common definitions is that proposed by Jennings and Wooldridge: 
“An  agent  is  a  computer  system  situated  in  some  environment  that  is  capable  of 
autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives” [11]. An 
intelligent agent is a flexible agent that is pro-active, reactive, or social and able to 
learn to improve its own performance [12].  
While agents work in the same agent framework (and often work together) they are 
inherently autonomous, and may have different and conflicting goals. This means that 
in  their  interactions  they  are  trying  to  maximize  their  own  benefit  (this  is  more 
formally described as maximizing a utility function). There is therefore a need to 
establish the rules by which agents can converse and negotiate with one another; this 
is called the agent protocol. For example, in situations where a group of agents need 
to come to a common decision a voting protocol can enable them to reach agreement 
as a group while taking into account individual preferences [13].  
Voting theory is an active area of research in multi-agent systems and one example 
of how agents can make decisions together in a decentralized way. It is part of the 
general area known as social choice, which is concerned with procedures for making 
collective decisions that maximize the social welfare (the sum of utility of individual 
agents), while at the same recognizing that agents are self-interested and act in a way 
that maximizes their own individual preferences. In the agent experiment described in 
Section 4 we use a novel voting procedure that combines two approaches: the single 
transferable vote STV1 and cumulative voting2. 
2.3   Agents in Technology Enhanced Learning 
In  TEL,  multi-agent  systems  appear  to  be  a promising  approach  to  deal  with  the 
challenges of educational environments. A number of researchers have applied agent 
technology to e-learning, however they often use the agents as advanced components, 
focusing on the individual agent and/or its relationship with an individual student, 
rather than looking at a system of agents that works together to achieve some goal.  
In this context, De Meo et al. [14] proposed the X-Learn system,  an XML-based 
multi-agent    system    for    adaptive    e-learning  based  on  user  preferences  and 
requirements.    However,  rather  than  the  multi-agent  aspect,  they  focus  on  the 
adaptation  itself  and  how  to  exploit  XML  technology  facilities  for  handling  and 
exchanging information related to e-learning activities.  
Shi et al. [15] designed an integrated multi-agent systems for computer science 
education  that  focuses  on  two  introductory  courses  where  the  learning  process  is 
student-centered, self-paced and highly interactive. They use Java RMI, JavaSpace 
and JATLite to create a web-based system; in this case they use personal agents to 
manage student’s data and their interactions with course material.  
                                                 
1This  is  a  multi-agent  voting  procedure  when  the  alternative  that  is  ranked  lowest  is 
removed. Votes that had this alternative ranked first will now have another alternative ranked 
first. This is repeated until one alternative remains. 
 
2 Here, each voter receives a number of points (usually the number of points is equal to the 
number of candidates), and they are free to choose how many points to allocate to each 
candidate. The candidates with the highest cumulative points are selected as winners Furthermore, Yang et al. [16] proposed to apply an intelligent system to enhance 
navigation-training systems that consists of the client portion and server portion using 
JADE framework. Like most work in this area, this paper focuses on the intelligence 
of individual agents themselves, rather than communications between agents. One 
exception to these approaches is Soh et al. [17] who have shown a system called 
Intelligent Multi-agent infrastructure for Distributed Systems in Education to support 
student in real time classroom where a buddy group is formed dynamically to support 
the members to achieve common goals.  
Although these papers apply agents to e-learning, only Soh et al. demonstrates any 
kind of self-organization, and none of them applies any fundamental agent theories, 
such as mechanism design or social choice theory, to guide their design choices. In 
contrast,  our  approach  is  to  explore  how  agent  systems  can  be  used  for 
decentralization  as  well  as  personalization.  For  example  in  our  experiment  we 
examine  how  voting  mechanisms  can  be  used  in  an  e-learning  scenario  where  a 
University agent represents all the modules available, and where student agents can 
vote in any way he or she prefers. Thus our work explores, for the first time, voting 
procedures  in  an  e-learning  setting,  and  the  consequences  of  the  resulting  system 
behavior for learners in that scenario.  
3   Motivational Scenarios 
We  believe  that  agents  have  the  potential  to  transform  Technology  Enhanced 
Learning by enabling scenarios that are simply not feasible with today’s technology. 
This  is  possible  because  of  some  of  the  key  features  of  agent  systems  such  as 
distributed control and agent autonomy. In this  section  we illustrate this potential 
through three different TEL scenarios that show how agent technologies could be 
used in e-learning to take full advantage of the agent’s ability to communicate and 
negotiate. Each case is composed of a description of the scenario, an analysis of the 
agent solutions that make the scenarios possible, and more speculative variations of 
the scenario that would share the same features. 
Through  the  scenarios  we  hope  to  show  how  certain  types  of  problem  in 
Technology  Enhanced  Learning  fit  with  known  agent  solutions  (Voting  systems, 
Coalition Formation, and Auction systems). We also hope to show how agent systems 
enable  a  very  high  level  of  personalization,  and  to  start  a  discussion  about  the 
implications for education in the future. 
In Section 4 we will take the first of these scenarios and describe a prototype agent 
system that supports it, along with a suitable voting protocol, and analysis of how 
potential strategies perform. In Section 5 we reflect on the scenarios and experiment 
in order to identify key issues and challenges that will arise from the use of agent 
systems in education. 
3.1 Scenario One: Module Selection 
Description. This scenario concerns a University that wants to support students who 
are interested in a wider variety of modules than it is possible for the University to offer. The University must therefore somehow choose which subset of modules to 
run. This is a common scenario with Higher Education degree courses, where often 
students are offered a number of modules, and for economic reasons only the most 
popular  modules  are  run.  However,  current  solutions  are  centralized,  requiring 
students  to  hand  over  their  preferences  to  a  central  algorithm  controlled  by  the 
University.  In  addition  students  are  unable  to  respond  to  cancelled  modules  by 
changing  their  preferences.  From  a  personalized  learning  point  of  view  this  is 
undesirable,  as  despite  the  tension  between  the  goals  of  the  institution  and  the 
students (the institution really wants to run as few modules as possible whereas each 
student wants to get the modules in which he or she has most interest) the student 
must hand over almost all control to an opaque process managed by the University. 
Agent  Solutions.  In  agent  systems  this  scenario  can  be  characterized  as  a  voting 
problem. It occurs whenever agents are required to invest in or vote for a limited 
number of options within a greater number of more or less attractive possibilities. 
There  are  numerous  potential  solutions  to  voting  problems  where  the  outcome 
impacts all the agents (sometimes described as problems of social choice) but through 
transparent protocols they offer fairness, decentralization and independence (as they 
allow agents to choose their own voting strategies). This distribution of control fits 
well with personalized learning. 
Variations. This scenario describes students making choices about modules within a 
single institution, however because agent solutions are decentralized an agent solution 
could also work in situations where students were choosing modules from multiple 
institutions (for example, as part of a personalized degree programme across Bologna 
compliant Universities). In this case, the factors taken into account in an individual 
agents  voting  strategy  might  also  include  issues  such  as  institutional  reputation, 
distance from home and student facilities. 
3.2 Scenario Two: Group Formation 
Description. In education it is often necessary for students to arrange themselves into 
groups for learning, for example to share equipment, to help with timetabling, or for 
pedagogical  activities  such  as  discussion.  Students  can  group  themselves,  or  be 
grouped by a teacher either randomly or based on some criteria. Group formation is 
important because although all students need to be allocated to a group, the mix of 
students  might  be  important.  For  instance,  it  may  be  desirable  to  have  a  mix  of 
abilities, so that no one group has an advantage over another in assessment. 
Current  solutions  are  normally  centralized,  meaning  that  students  cannot  have 
different criteria for group selection (for example, some students might wish to be in 
the most effective groups, while others would rather learn with existing friends) – 
similarly to Scenario One this one-size-fits-all approach is at odds with personalized 
learning and requirements to consider the learner experience.  
An interesting aspect of this scenario is that sometimes the goals of the teachers are 
at odds with the goals of the students. The students may wish to be placed in groups 
with their friends or with students that will help them to achieve good marks, while 
the teacher may want to arrange students in groups that will help them to learn more material or to learn it more quickly. This means that even non-centralized solutions 
may need to be mediated by a central authority. 
Agent  Solutions.  In  agent  systems  an  appropriate  metaphor  for  this  scenario  is 
coalition formation - a process by which agents form, join and switch groups until a 
stable set of coalitions is made. There are numerous potential protocols for this, for 
example by having an initial allocation, perhaps based on criteria set by the teacher, 
and then for the students to negotiate exchanging their places with students in other 
groups.  The  agent  framework  provides  the  conversational  mechanism  for  this 
negotiation, but the agents need some self-organization. For example, each coalition 
might produce a virtual leader agent to negotiate with the leaders of the other groups. 
At the same time, each leader agent has to negotiate with the teacher agent because 
any changes made in group membership still have to conform to the constraints set by 
the teacher agent. 
Variations. This scenario envisages group formation occurring under the supervision 
of a teacher or lecturer, and therefore implies a  more  formal educational context. 
However,  distributed  group  formation  enabled  by  agents  could  enable  informal 
learners to also benefit from group work, by helping them form coalition with other 
(potentially remote learners) who share similar pedagogical goals. Such distributed 
agent-based group formation systems could be of great help to life-long learners, and 
could form the basis of informal group work and peer assessment without the need for 
a mediating teacher or institution.  
3.3 Scenario Three: Personalized Learning  
Description.  Different  students  may  have  different  personal  preferences  about  the 
way  they  want  to  learn  or  to  be  assessed.  These  preferences  may  be  because  of 
preferred learning styles, but could also be for other practical reasons (such as time 
commitments in their personal lives, or different project requirements). An institution 
has  difficulty  catering  for  these  preferences,  due  to  the  mixed  cost  of  providing 
different  activities  (for  example,  lectures  are  cheaper  than  tutorials),  resource 
restrictions (such as time commitments of staff, or access to specialized equipment or 
information sources) and their own guidelines and regulations about having a mixed 
set of assessment styles (for example, many Universities are cautious about having 
modules assessed totally by course work).  
It is therefore rare for an institution to allow much flexibility at an individual level, 
although there are limited solutions that allow a cohort to make choices about how 
they will be taught or assessed, but these tend to be managed directly by teachers and 
are therefore of limited complexity (for example, it might be possible for the students 
to negotiate with their teacher about the methods of learning or assessment that will 
be used).   
Agent Solutions. In this kind of scenario there are a number of limited resources 
(tutorial slots, lab equipment, seminar places, etc.) and many individuals competing 
for them. In agent systems this situation is characterized as an auction. The institution 
associates a cost with each type of activity and wants to minimize the total cost, or at 
least  prevent  it  from  rising  above  an  agreed  level.  This  cost  need  not  be  only financial; it could include factors such as value to external assessors or complexity for 
staff to manage.  
There are many different kinds of auction, and therefore different solutions to this 
problem.  But  as  an  example  we  can  define  a  utility  function  for  each  agent  that 
calculates their student’s satisfaction with the activities that they have been allocated. 
Following  an  initial  allocation,  agents  could  then  bargain  (negotiate)  with  their 
institution,  exchanging  items  according  to  their  cost  until  their  utility  function  is 
maximized within the constraints of the institution’s cost level.  
Variations. Using an economic model allows a University to adjust the wealth (and 
therefore  purchasing  power)  of  certain  students  according  to  circumstances.  For 
example, students with learning differences, such as dyslexia, could be given more 
credit, allowing them to tailor their learning experience within the same economic 
framework as other students. More controversially students might actually be allowed 
to  purchase  additional  credit,  in  effect  buying  themselves  more  expensive  tuition 
through the University fees system. 
4   Agent Simulation and Experiment 
In  Section  3  we  described  a  number  of  TEL  Scenarios  and  described  how  agent 
technologies could be used to solve them in a decentralized way. But what would be 
the  performance  of  such  a  system,  how  would  it  behave  and  what  would  be  the 
consequences for the learners and the institution? In this section we attempt to answer 
these  questions  by  presenting  an  agent  simulation  of  Scenario  One  (decentralized 
module selection using a voting protocol).  To do this we must describe the context 
for our simulation (number of students, modules, etc.), the agent protocol (the rules 
under which the agents negotiate), and the strategies taken by individual agents. We 
can then use the system to demonstrate how a decentralized approach compares to an 
optimal  centralized  solution,  and  to  compare  the  performance  of  different  student 
strategies. 
4.1   Context for the Simulation 
In our experiment we considered three different cases. These differ in terms of the 
number of students, the number of total modules, and the number of running modules. 
We choose these cases to reflect the kind of modules typical in UK computer science 
departments. We consider a large (undergraduate), medium (smaller undergraduate) 
and small (postgraduate) module. Table 1 shows the settings for these scenarios. 
 
 
 Table 1.  Different setting to the scenarios. 
Case  # modules 
(m) 
#running modules 
(r)  #students (n) 
1  51  10  20  30  40  100 
2  33  9  18  27  60 
3  15  4  8  12  20 
In our system, each agent is autonomous, that is, it is in control of its own actions 
and responses. The system consists of two types of agents: student agents (SAs) and 
the university agent (UA). SAs and the UA use a voting procedure to interact with 
each other and to choose which modules to run. To this end, the UA manages the 
votes cast by the student agents and decides, based on the voting procedure and the 
votes received, which modules will be cancelled. Furthermore, after completing the 
entire process, it will provide the SAs with a final list of running modules. 
4.2   Protocol 
In general, a protocol is the set of rules that controls the interactions between agents 
and determines the beginning and end conditions of a given conversation [18]. The 
protocol we used in our system works in several stages. In each stage, the students can 
cast their votes for the modules by allocating points to each module. The module that 
receives the lowest number of cumulative points is cancelled, and the points that were 
allocated to the cancelled module are refunded. In the next round, the students can use 
these points (and any points that they did not use in the previous rounds), to vote 
again. Furthermore, in each round, the students are informed about which module is 
cancelled and the total number of points that have been allocated to the remaining 
modules so far. Note that, once allocated, a student cannot retrieve its points, unless 
the module is cancelled. The advantage of this iterative approach is that votes are not 
wasted since points allocated to the cancelled module can be reused for the remaining 
modules.  Furthermore,  the  student  can  use  the  information  about  the  current 
“popularity” (i.e. the current cumulative points) of the modules to guide its voting 
behavior (we discuss the potential strategies of students in more detail in Section 4).  
For example, if there are 40 modules available in total, but the university only has 
sufficient resources (e.g. staff and lecture rooms) to run 30 modules, then the voting 
will  proceed  for  10  iterations  or  rounds.  At  the  end  of  each  of  these  rounds,  the 
module with the least number of cumulative points is cancelled. 
4.3   Strategies 
Abstractly, a strategy determines the agent’s plan of action to achieve a particular 
goal. It specifies the way in which an agent behaves in a given environment [13] . In 
our scenario, the strategy determines the number of points to allocate to the modules 
in each voting round, given the preferences of the agent and the information received by the UA about the voting process. In this experiment we compared three different 
strategies for the SAs in order to explore what would happen to students that adopted 
different strategies. These strategies were: proportional, equal share and intelligent. 
Proportional: The proportional strategy was included as an example of a simple but 
sensible strategy. Consequently, it provides a good benchmark that we can use to 
compare the performance of more sophisticated strategies. The main idea behind a 
proportional strategy is that, in each round of voting, the student agent distributes its 
points proportionally to the student’s preferences for each module. This strategy is 
simple in that it does not consider the information received by the UA about the 
current number of points allocated to the modules.  
In more detail, the number of points allocated to module j is calculated as follows. 
Let RP denote the total number of points remaining (in the first round IP=RP),  m is 
the total number of available modules available, and the vector           =    ,  ,,….,    
denotes the student preferences. Then, the total number of points to be allocated to 
module j,    is: 
   =
  
∑   
 
   
 .    (1) 
Equal share: The equal share strategy is included as an example of a very simple and 
ineffective  strategy,  and  provides  a  good  lower  bound  on  the  performance  of  the 
system.  An  equal  share  strategy  is  based  on  the  principle  that  the  SA  gives  all 
modules  an  equal  number  of  votes,  regardless  of  the  student’s  preference.  The 
following formula was used to calculate voting points each module: 
   =
  
 
    (2) 
Intelligent:  The  intelligent  strategy  is  included  as  an  example  of  what  can  be 
achieved  with  a  more  sophisticated  strategy  that  learns  as  the  voting  procedure 
progresses from one round to the next. The main idea behind this strategy is that, in 
each round, the agent tries to predict the probability that a module will be cancelled 
based  on  the  number  of  points  currently  awarded  to  each  module  from  previous 
rounds. Then, based on this probability, it can calculate its expected satisfaction for a 
given  allocation  of  points,  and  it  will  allocate  the  points  such  that  the  expected 
satisfaction is maximized.  
In more detail, the probability of a module being cancelled is estimated using a 
softmax  function,  which  is  commonly  used  in  discrete  choice  theory  to  make 
decisions in the case of incomplete information [19]. The probability that a module i 
is going to be cancelled in the future is given by: 
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  (3) 
Where cp  is the cumulative number of points which have so far been allocated to 
module i, and    is the number of points that the student agent is planning to allocate to module i in the current voting round, and      is the vector of points to be allocated. 
Furthermore,     is  constant  which  weights  the  importance  of  the  current  point 
allocation (for example, if   = 0, then each module is equally likely to be cancelled, 
but as   → ∞, the module with the lowest total number of points will be cancelled 
with probability 1, and all other modules will be cancelled with probability 0). 
We  can  use  this  probability  to  calculate  the  expected  satisfaction,  ES,  of  the 
student. The expected satisfaction is given by: 
  (    ) =  (1 −            (    )) ∙   
 
   
  (4) 
The next step is then to find the allocation that maximises this expected utility. We 
estimate this using a search algorithm based on random sampling: 
1. We randomly generate an allocation vector        subject to the constraint that the 
total number of points is equal to the maximum number of points that we would 
like to spend in the current round.  
2. The student agent calculates the expected satisfaction.    
3. If  the  current  solution  has  a  higher  expected  satisfaction  than  any  previous 
solution, then keep the solution. Otherwise, discard it.  
4. This process is repeated for 1000 times and the solution with the highest 
expected utility is kept. 
In our experiments, the number of points allocated in any round was 50%, except 
in the last voting round where we allocate all remaining points. In the first round 
(where there is no existing allocation of points) we use the proportional strategy (but 
only use 50% of the available points).  
4.4   Comparing Agent Strategies to the Optimal 
In the first part of our experiment we compared the agent strategies explained above 
to the optimal case in which the University Agent has access to all of the preference 
information and  makes the decisions centrally. Our objective is to discover if the 
decentralized agent solutions can match a centralized approach 
In  each  of  the  experiments  that  follow,  each  scenario  was  run  30  times  with 
different preferences. Thus, the results shown are the average results over these runs. 
Figure 1 shows the results for cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Here, the y axis shows 
the percentage of student satisfaction. This is calculated by the total satisfaction of the 
running modules, as a percentage of the total satisfaction if all the modules would be 
running. Furthermore, on the x axis we vary the total number of running modules 
(while keeping the other parameters in the scenarios  fixed). The graphs show the 
differences  in  the  satisfaction  of  the  agents  using  different  strategies  and  also 
compares this with the satisfaction of the optimal solution. 
These results show that the outcome of the proportional strategy is almost identical 
to  the  optimal  strategy  (although  this  is  not  visible  in  the  figure,  there  is  some 
difference but this is not statistically significant), and the intelligent strategy does 
slightly less well but is still very close to optimal. On the other hand, we see that the equal  share  strategy  does  significantly  worse.  This  suggests  that  a  decentralized 
solution using voting results in high quality solutions that are comparable to optimal.  
 
 
 
Figure. 1. Results for Case 1 (left), Case 2 (centre), Case 3 (right) 
4.4   Comparing Agent Strategies to Each Other 
In the next set of experiments we compare the case where a proportion of the students 
use one strategy, and the remainder of the students uses another strategy. This allows 
us to see what would happen if students used a mixture of strategies to choice their 
options. We might expect some strategies to work better than others.   
If all the students had random preferences then the agents would cancel each other 
out regardless of their strategy choice, so in order to show the effect of strategy we 
biased the preferences in such a way that the students using the same strategy are also 
likely to have similar preferences.  In this way each group of students with the same 
strategy  is  pulling  in  the  same  direction.  We  can  then  measure  the  comparative 
success of each strategy by looking at the satisfaction within each group. We can also 
compare the power of the strategies by varying the size of the group. 
In the results that follow, the y axis shows the percentage of satisfaction for each 
group  of  agents  using  a  particular  strategy.  The  x  axis  shows  the  proportion  of 
students using a particular strategy. For example, in Figure 2, 90-10 means that 90 
students use the proportional strategy, and 10 students use the equal share strategy.  
The results in Figures 2 show that the intelligent and proportional strategies are 
both significantly better than the equal share, irrespective of the proportion of students 
that use this strategy. On average, the improvement is around 8% compared to the 
equal share strategy. The results shown are for case 1 (see Table 1) with 40 students, 
but the results for other cases are very similar and not shown to avoid repetition. 
Figures  3  show  the  results  of  comparing  the  intelligent  strategy  and  the 
proportional strategy for the 3 different cases. The result show that, as the number of 
students allocated to a particular strategy increases, the student satisfaction for these 
students also increases. However, this is mainly because of the bias that has been 
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Equal Share Intelligentintroduced;  since  students  with  the  same  strategy  have  similar  preferences,  when 
more students have these preferences they have greater voting power since they act as 
a group. The difference in the effectiveness of the strategies can be seen by comparing 
the number of students needed in a group for it to become the most successful.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Left: Proportional vs. Equal Share, Right: Intelligent vs. Equal Share  
 
 
Figure 3. Intelligent vs. Proportional. Case 1 (left), Case 2 (centre), Case 3 (right)  
 
Comparing the intelligent and proportional strategies, it can be seen that there is 
not much difference between them. Although in Case 3 the intelligent strategy slightly 
outperforms the proportional strategy (given the same number of students are using 
that  strategy),  in  the  other  two  cases,  the  proportional  strategy  outperforms  the 
intelligent  strategy.    We  have  also  tried  to  vary  the  parameters  of  the  intelligent 
strategy (such as the beta parameter), but the results do not change significantly.  This 
suggests that a learner who takes a more advanced intelligent strategy cannot easily 
exploit the system. 
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Proportional5   Discussion 
Through  the  Scenarios  described  in  Section  3  and  the  experimental  simulation  in 
Section 4 we have explored how multi-agent systems could be used for TEL. While 
others have focused on agents as containers of student information and user interface 
adaptation, we have focused on their ability to act autonomously in a system and to 
negotiate with one another to reach an agreed outcome. 
Our work shows that when used in this way agents provide two key advantages: 
 
•  Ultra-personalization – In a multi-agent system autonomous agents allow for 
unprecedented levels of personalization. Not only can students have preferences 
about any given learning scenario, but by selecting different strategies they can 
change the way in which their agents negotiate. For example, in the module 
selection scenario students have different preferences and in our experiment can 
choose  different  strategies  for  negotiating  based  on  those  preferences.  But  it 
would also be possible to introduce other student agents that had a completely 
different basis for choosing modules (for example, based on the choices of their 
friends, or on the requirements of some qualification framework). Multi-agent 
systems  provide  the  necessary  level  of  abstraction  for  the  tailoring  of  every 
aspect  of  the  negotiation,  including  the  basis  for  making  choices  (e.g. 
preferences  or  some  other  criteria),  the  individual’s  personal  data  (e.g.  the 
preferences themselves), and the algorithm that uses that data to negotiate (e.g. 
how to vote according to those preferences).   
•  Decentralization – In Section 3 we argued that agent systems could provide 
decentralized solutions to a number of key TEL problems. In Section 4 we have 
demonstrated that not only is this possible, but that if students choose sensible 
strategies the results tend towards an optimal solution (calculated as the result of 
a centralized approach). 
However, we also believe that our work highlights potential concerns: 
 
•  Equitability  –  In  situations  of  ultra-personalization  it  is  very  difficult  to 
guarantee that all students will have the same potential for satisfaction. This is 
because, although the agents are handled equally, the system relies on the agents 
themselves making sensible choices and selections. Power and responsibility are 
both transferred from a central authority (the institution) to the individual agents 
(the students). If an agent makes irrational choices, or chooses a bad strategy, 
then their student will be disadvantaged when compared to others. In Section 4 
we demonstrated this by showing how a foolish equal share strategy penalized 
students who acted in that way, however we also showed how a well-designed 
protocol had made it difficult for a more intelligent (or intentionally subversive 
strategy) to gain advantage over a sensible strategy. •  Scrutability – in decentralized systems it can be very difficult for any individual 
in the system to see and understand the big picture, making accountability and 
transparency difficult. Although in our experiment the University Agent was in a 
position to see the voting behavior of all the students, it is possible to imagine 
situations where no single agent understands the sequence of events that lead the 
system as a whole reaching a decision (for example, if multiple institutions had 
been involved in our scenario then no one of them  would have  seen all the 
voting behavior).  Institutions in particular may find it difficult to engage in a 
system where they cannot fully account for the outcome. 
6   Conclusions and Future Work 
The main aim of this work was to investigate how the autonomy and negotiation 
aspects  of  multi-agent  technology  might  impact  on  the  domain  of  Technology 
Enhanced Learning. Using three scenarios we have shown how common multi-agent 
solutions (voting, coalition formation and auction systems) map to problems in TEL. 
We  argue  that  multi-agent  technologies  could  allow  genuine  decentralization  and 
ultra-personalization  allowing  these  scenarios  to  be  extended  to  include  types  of 
personal and informal learning that are difficult to support with today’s systems.  
As  an  illustration  we  took  the  first  of  these  scenarios  (module  selection)  and 
presented  a  multi-agent  simulation  that  uses  a  suitable  voting  protocol  to  support 
module  selection.  Using  our  simulation  we  have  been  able  to  show  that  a 
decentralized agent approach not only works, but that with reasonable agent strategies 
it approximates an optimal centralized solution. We have also been able to show how 
different agent strategies compare to one another, revealing that with this particular 
protocol simplistic strategies are penalized, but that it is difficult to use intelligent 
(subversive) strategies to significantly improve on a naïve sensible strategy.  
Based on the scenarios and experiment we believe that agent systems have a great 
deal of potential for TEL, but that their use raises concerns about the equitability of 
results (as agents become responsible for their own performance) and the scrutability 
of the process (as no single agent understands the system as a whole). Depending on 
the context this may impact on the acceptability to stakeholders of using an agent-
system in a given scenario. 
In our future work we intend to explore more sophisticated versions of the module 
choice  scenario,  where  agents  use  different  selection  criteria  and  where  there  are 
multiple  institutions  vying  for  student  interests.  Our  aim  is  to  help  establish  the 
characteristics of agent protocols that makes them either equitable or scrutable, and to 
investigate the feasibility of more ambitious scenarios.   
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